





AN INTEGRATED ANOMALY INTRUSION DETECTION SCHEME USING 





















Thesis Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies, Universiti Putra Malaysia, in 















All material contained within the thesis, including without limitation text, logos, icons, 
photographs and all other artwork, is copyright material of Universiti Putra Malaysia 
unless otherwise stated. Use may be made of any material contained within the thesis 
for non-commercial purposes from the copyright holder. Commercial use of material 
may only be made with the express, prior, written permission of Universiti Putra 
Malaysia. 
 





























































































Abstract of thesis presented to the Senate of Universiti Putra Malaysia in fulfilment of 
the requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
AN INTEGRATED ANOMALY INTRUSION DETECTION SCHEME USING 








Chairman:      Nur Izura Udzir, Ph.D. 
Faculty:          Computer Science and Information Technology    
 
 
Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) effectively balance additional security in a computer 
system by identifying intrusive activities on a computer system, and their 
enhancements are developing at a surprising rate. Detection methods based on 
statistical and data mining techniques are widely deployed as anomaly-based detection 
system (ADS). Although the statistical-based anomaly detection (SAD) method 
fascinates researchers, the low attack detection rates (also known as the detection of 
true positive) that reflect the effectiveness of the detection system generally persist. 
Specifically, this is due to the packets affected by the outlier data points (i.e., the data 
points that have a huge dissimilarity with the common data points) and the defined 
threshold size that is usually performed without any further analysis on the observed 
packet. It provides a significant effect in the process to determine which packet is more 
likely attributes to the anomalous behaviour.  In recent years, data mining based 
anomaly detection (DMAD), particularly classification methods, have been incessantly 
enhanced in differentiating normal and attack behaviour. Unfortunately, in such 
methods the outcomes, i.e., true positive, true negative, false positive and false negative 
detections that directly influence the rates of accuracy, detection, and false alarms are 
not much improved and thus raise a persistent problem in the employment of such 
systems. The specific drawback that causes this is the failure to differentiate the packets 
behaviour that resembles a similar behaviour more precisely, such as a normal 
behaviour having a similar anomalous content behaviour and vice versa. These 
inaccurate outcomes can compromise the reliability of IDSs and cause them to 
overlook the attacks. As ADS can process massive volumes of packets, the amount of 
processing time needed to discover the pattern of the packets is also increased 
accordingly and resulting in late detection of the attack packets. The main contributor 
for such a shortcoming is the need to re-compute every process for each packet despite 
the attack behaviour having been examined.  
 
 
This study aims to improve the detection of an anomalous behaviour by identifying the 
outlier data points in the packets more precisely, maximizes the detection of packets 
with similar behaviours more accurately while reducing the detection time. An 
Integrated Anomaly Detection Scheme ( IADS)  is proposed to overcome the aforesaid 
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drawbacks. The proposed scheme integrates an ADS and signature-based detection 
system (SDS) approach for better and rapid intrusion detection. Therefore, Statistical-
based Packet Header Anomaly Detection (SPHAD) and a hybridized Naive Bayes and 
Random Forest classifier (NB+RF) are considered for the ADS,  and Signature-based 
Packet Header Intrusion Detection (SPHID) is proposed as the SDS. In SPHAD, 
statistical analysis is used to construct a normal profile using statistical formula, 
scoring the incoming packets, and computing the relationships between historic normal 
behaviour as a dependent variable against observable packet behaviours as the 
independent variable through linear regression. Then the threshold measurement (size) 
is defined based on R2 and Cohen’s-d values in order to improve the attack detection 
rate by identifying a set of outlier data points which are present inside the packets more 
precisely. Subsequently, NB+RF, a hybrid classification algorithm is used to 
distinguish similar and dissimilar content behaviours of a packet. The Naive Bayes 
(NB) classifier is employed to construct the values of the posterior and the prior 
probability of a packet, then this information as well as the header values and statistical 
analysis information are fed to the Random Forest (RF) classifier to improve the 
detection of actual attacks and normal packets. SPHID then extracts the distinct 
behaviour of the packets which are verified as attacks by NB+RF and compute it as 
attack signatures for faster future detections, as the detection time will be reduced for 
the attack whose signature is already included in the signature database.  
 
 
The effectiveness of the IADS has been evaluated under different detection capabilities 
(i.e., false positive, false negative, true positive, true negative, false alarm, accuracy, 
detection rate, attack data detection rate, normal data detection rate) and detection times 
using the DARPA 1999 and ISCX 2012 intrusion detection benchmark datasets as well 
as with Live-data. Results from the experiments demonstrate that IADS could 
effectively detect attacks and normal packets more precisely compared to previous 
work and the ADS which performs intrusion detections without employing the SPHID 
method. In addition, the detection time of IADS is much improved as compared to 
ADS. Thus, IADS is a better solution for anomaly detection methods in detecting 





















Abstrak tesis yang dikemukakan kepada Senat Universiti Putra Malaysia sebagai 
memenuhi keperluan untuk Ijazah Doktor Falsafah 
 
SKIM PENGESANAN PENCEROBOHAN ANOMALI BERSEPADU 
MENGGUNAKAN KAEDAH STATISTIK, PENGELAS HIBRID DAN 








Pengerusi:    Nur Izura Udzir, Ph.D. 
Fakulti:        Sains Komputer dan Teknologi Maklumat   
 
 
Sistem pengesanan pencerobohan (IDS) memperseimbangkan alat tambahan 
keselamatan secara efektif dengan mengenal pasti aktiviti pencerobohan pada sistem 
komputer, dan penambahbaikan alat ini kerap berlaku pada kadar yang tidak dijangka. 
Kaedah-kaedah sistem pengesanan pencerobohan berasaskan anomali (ADS), yang 
menggunakan algoritma perlombongan data mampu mengenal pasti serangan-serangan 
yang tidak dikenali. Walaupun kaedah pengesanan anomali berasaskan statistik (SAD) 
memikat penyelidik, kadar pengesanan pencerobohan yang rendah yang juga dikenali 
sebagai pengesanan benar positif, mencerminkan keberkesanan sistem pengesanan 
umumnya berterusan. Khususnya, ia disebabkan oleh paket yang terjejas akibat titik-
titik terpencil iaitu titik data yang mempunyai perbezaan besar dengan titik data biasa, 
dan saiz ambang yang biasanya ditakrifkan tanpa melakukan apa-apa analisa lanjutan 
terhadap paket yang diperhatikan. Ia memberi kesan yang ketara dalam proses untuk 
menentukan paket mana yang lebih cenderung kepada sifat-sifat tingkah laku yang 
beranomali. Sejak kebelakangan ini, pengesanan anomali berasaskan perlombongan 
data (DMAD), khususnya kaedah klasifikasi di tambah baik secara berterusan dalam 
membezakan tingkah laku normal dan pencerobohan. Malangnya, menerusi 
penggunaan kaedah ini, hasil output iaitu pengesanan packet normal dan pencerobohan 
yang secara langsung mempengaruhi kadar ketepatan, kadar pengesanan dan kadar 
‘false alarm’ tidak diperbaiki ke tahap yang lebih baik serta menimbulkan masalah 
dalam penggunaan sistem pengesanan anomali secara berterusan. Kelemahan khusus 
yang menyebabkan keadaan ini adalah akibat daripada kegagalan untuk membezakan 
tingkah laku kandungan paket yang menyerupai tingkah laku yang lain dengan lebih 
tepat, contohnya tingkah laku paket normal yang menyerupai tingkah laku paket 
beranomali dan sebaliknya. Hasil yang tidak tepat boleh menjejaskan kebolehpercayaan 
IDSs dan menyebabkan mereka terlepas pandang packet pencerobohan. 
Memandangkan ADS mampu memproses jumlah packets yang besar, jumlah masa 
pemprosesan yang diperlukan untuk menemui bentuk paket turut meningkat dan 
menyebabkan kelewatan dalam pengesanan paket pencerobohan.  Penyumbang utama 
untuk kekurangan ini ialah keperluan untuk mengira semula setiap proses bagi setiap 
paket walaupun tingkah laku pencerobohan yang terlibat sudah diperiksa sebelum ini. 
Kajian ini bertujuan untuk membaiki mahupun meningkatkan pengesanan tingkah laku 
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beranomali dengan mengenalpasti titik-titik data terpencil di dalam paket dan 
memaksimumkan pengesanan paket yang mempunyai tigkah laku yang sama dengan 
lebih tepat disamping mengurangkan masa pengesanan. Satu skim pengesanan anomali 
bersepadu (IADS) dicadangkan untuk mengatasi kelemahan-kelemahan di atas. Skim 
yang dicadangkan menyepadukan ADS dan pendekatan sistem pengesanan tanda kenal 
(SDS) untuk pengesanan pencerobohan yang lebih baik dan cepat. Oleh itu, 
pengesanan anomali pengepala paket berasaskan kaedah statistik (SPHAD) dan 
pengelas hibrid Naive Bayes dan Random Forest (NB+RF) yang dicadangkan 
dipertimbangkan sebagai sistem ADS, dan pengesanan intrusi pengepala paket 
berasaskan tanda kenal (SPHID) sebagai SDS. Analisa statistik digunakan untuk 
membina profil normal menerusi formula statistik, memberi skor kepada setiap paket 
yang masuk dan mengira perhubungan antara tingkah laku paket normal sejarah yang 
digunakan sebagai pembolehubah bersandar terhadap tingkah laku paket baharu yang 
boleh dicerap sebagai pembolehubah bebas melalui regresi linear di dalam SPHAD. 
Kemudian ukuran (saiz) ambang ditakrif berdasarkan nilai-nilai R2 dan Cohen’s-d 
untuk meningkatkan mahupun membaiki kadar pengesanan pencerobohan dengan 
mengenalpasti titik-titik data terpencil yang berada di dalam paket dengan lebih tepat. 
Selepas itu, NB+RF, algoritma pengelas hibrid digunakan untuk membezakan tingkah 
laku kandungan paket yang sama dan yang berbeza. Pengelas Naive Bayes (NB) 
digunakan untuk membina nilai-nilai kebarangkalian 'prior' dan 'posterior' sesuatu 
paket terlebih dahulu, kemudian nilai-nilai tersebut, kandungan nilai pengepala paket 
serta maklumat berkenaan analisa statistik disalurkan kepada pengelas Random Forest 
(RF) untuk meningkatkan mahupun membaiki pengesanan paket pencerobohan dan 
normal yang sebenar. SPHID mengekstrak tingkah laku paket yang unik yang 
ditentusahkan sebagai pencerobohan oleh NB+RF dan mengiranya sebagai tanda kenal 
pencerobohan untuk mengesan pencerobohan dengan lebih cepat pada masa akan 
datang, dimana masa pengesanan dapat dikurangkan sekiranya tanda kenal bagi sesuatu 
pencerobohan didapati wujud di dalam pangkalan data tanda kenal.  
 
 
Keberkesanan IADS telah dinilai di bawah keupayaan pengesanan yang berbeza iaitu 
positif palsu, negatif palsu, positif benar, negatif benar,kadar  'false alarm',  kadar 
ketepatan, kadar pengesanan, kadar pengesanan data pencerobohan dan kadar 
pengesanan data normal serta tempoh masa pengesanan menggunakan data-data 
penanda aras pengesanan pencerobohan seperti DARPA 1999, ISCX 2012 serta data 
hidup. Keputusan eksperimen menunjukkan bahawa IADS dapat mengesan paket-paket 
pencerobohan dan normal dengan lebih tepat berbanding dengan kajian sebelum ini 
serta ADS, yang merupakan skim yang melakukan pengesanan pencerobohan tanpa 
menggunakan kaedah SPHID. Tambahan pula, pengesanan masa IADS adalah baik 
berbanding dengan kaedah ADS. Oleh itu, IADS merupakan satu penyelesaian yang 
lebih memuaskan untuk kaedah ADS dalam mengesan tingkah laku yang tidak 
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Protecting an organization’s assets against threats from the network has become a 
major challenge in the wake of increasing network-based attacks. In addition, the 
confidential assets and vulnerabilities of computer and network systems could be 
exposed to cyber attacks if not well protected with security defenders. Cyber attacks are 
invasive tactics or operations used by unethical parties either from corporations or 
individuals against vulnerable systems (i.e., computer systems, computer networks, 
computer infrastructures, and computer information) in an attempt to modify, steal 
and/or destroy them (Kuang, 2007). Denial-of-service, Web site defacement, password 
sniffing, web browser exploits, and breach of access are examples of the consequences 
which could result from cyber attacks. In addition, these attacks have become more 
sophisticated and harmful as the Stuxnet (Karnouskos, 2011; Vida et al., 2014) worm 
recently showed.     
 
 
Consequently, it is extremely important to develop mechanisms for intrusion detection 
in view of the conviction that suspicious activities can be detectable by taking measures 
to avoid their further breeding against computer networks or systems. Intrusion 
detection is the process of monitoring the activities taking place in a computer or 
network system and scrutinizing them for indications of potential intrusions and in 
determining suspicious activities there. Thus, intrusion detection systems (IDSs) are 
formed to detect cyber attack activities attempting to compromise the confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability (CIA) of interconnected computing systems (Zhou, 2005). 






Electronic transactions, online banking, hosting portals, etc., have raised Internet usage 
dramatically and cover almost the entire globe. Unfortunately, these trends also fuel 
hacking activities and dangerous cyber attacks that are able to breach even the strongest 
firewalls. Data from the Malaysia Computer Emergency Response Team (MyCERT)1 
show a significant growth in cyber attacks in 2014 (Figure 1.1).  Total cyber incidents 
from 2000 to 2014 are presented in Figure 1.2. 
` 
  
Cyber attacks have become an novel weapon of war around the world and their 
persistent growth against computer and network systems makes it critical to integrate 
more accurate IDS capable of maximizing correctly detectable data (i.e., true positives 
and negatives) and minimizing falsely detectable data (false positives and negatives) as 
                                                 
1 http://www.mycert.org.my 
